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This paper examines electoral accountability after the 2009–10 UK expenses scandal.
Existing research shows that Members of Parliament (MPs) implicated in the scandal fared
only marginally worse in the election than non-implicated colleagues. This lack of electoral
accountability for misconduct could have arisen either because voters did not know about
their representative’s wrongdoing or because they chose not to electorally sanction them.
We combine panel survey data with new measures of MP implication in the expenses
scandal to test where electoral accountability failed. We ﬁnd that MP implication inﬂu-
enced voter perceptions of wrongdoing more than expected. In contrast, constituents were
only marginally less likely to vote for MPs who were implicated in the scandal. Electoral
accountability may therefore be constrained even when information about representative
misconduct is easily available and clearly inﬂuences voter perceptions.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In a representative democracy, regular elections provide
a potential mechanism for voters to hold politicians
accountable for their performance by enabling the removal
of ofﬁce-holders that are under-performing (Key, 1966;
Ferejohn, 1986; Besley, 2006). Such electoral accountability
has been shown to exist for a variety of aspects of repre-
sentatives’ record: for instance, their handling of the
economy (see e.g. Powell and Whitten, 1993; Lewis-Beckd at the 2011 EPSA
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BY-NC-ND license.and Stegmaier, 2000; Samuels and Hellwig, 2010) or their
policy stances as expressed in votes in the legislature
(Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010;
Vivyan and Wagner, 2012). Other scholars have asked
whether voters also hold representatives electorally
accountable for unethical or corrupt behaviour (Rundquist
et al., 1977; Peters and Welch, 1980; Chang et al., 2010). To
do this, voters need to, ﬁrst, update perceptions about the
politician’s conduct if he or she is revealed to have engaged
in misconduct, and second, take electoral choices based on
these perceptions (Ferejohn, 1986; Przeworski et al., 1999;
Besley, 2006).
This paper uses the case of the 2009–10 UK expenses
scandal to conduct a unique test of the functioning of these
two necessary steps for electoral accountability for miscon-
duct. During the expenses scandal the media and ofﬁcial
investigations exposedmanyMembers of Parliament (MPs)
as having made improper claims under parliamentary
allowances schemes. Thus, a large number of sitting legis-
lators were publicly implicated for similar types of
misconduct in a relatively short space of time. In other
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legislators were implicated while holding the type of
scandal and the national political circumstances relatively
constant. The UK expenses scandal therefore provides
a particularly advantageous setting to test the functioning
of electoral accountability for misconduct.
Yet this scandal also presents us with a puzzle: even
though voters felt strongly about expenses-related
misconduct by their MPs, electoral accountability for this
misconduct was severely limited. On the one hand, survey
evidence suggests that the scandal was highly salient to
voters in Britain. According to the 2010 British Election
Study (BES) pre-election survey carried out nine months
after the scandal ﬁrst erupted, 93 per cent of British voters
had heard of the scandal, while over 90 per cent still agreed
or strongly agreed with the statement that the scandal
made them very angry. Moreover, 80 per cent of voters
agreed or strongly agreed that MPs implicated in the
scandal should resign.2 On the other hand, aggregate
evidence indicates that at the ballot box voters largely did
not punish MPs who had been publicly implicated in the
scandal. Among sitting MPs who stood for re-election in
2010, the electoral cost of implication in the scandal has so
far been estimated at around 1.5 per cent (Curtice et al.,
2010; Eggers and Fischer, 2011; Pattie and Johnston,
in press).
Why, in a case such as this, is electoral accountability for
misconduct so limited? One potential explanation is that
the MPs exposed as having made the most egregious
expenses claims anticipated electoral punishment and
therefore declined to re-stand for election at the 2010
general election. Yet existing analysis shows that even
among those MPs most severely publicly implicated in the
expenses scandal, over 50 per cent chose to stand for re-
election in 2010 (Pattie and Johnston, in press). Thus,
strategic retirement cannot entirely explain the apparent
lack of electoral accountability for expenses-related
misconduct in 2010. Instead, we have to consider why the
accountability link may function poorly even when repre-
sentatives whose wrongdoing has been exposed decide to
run for ofﬁce again. We argue that this can occur for two
reasons: either voters do not form or update their beliefs
about representatives based on new public information
concerning their conduct, or citizens do not cast their vote
in such a way that politicians they believe are guilty of
misconduct are less likely to retain ofﬁce. Put simply,
electoral accountability for misconduct can fail at either of
either the perception or the sanction step. In this paper, we
test these two explanations empirically.
In doing so, we address key theoretical debates in the
literature. Several existing theories would predict that
accountability fails at the perceptions step. Speciﬁcally,
voters may either not know about their representative’s
behaviour (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Holmberg, 2009)
or develop incorrect perceptions based on personal or
partisan biases (Campbell et al., 1960; Fenno, 1978; Peters
and Welch, 1980; Ferejohn, 1990). Other accounts would2 BES 2010 pre-election internet cross-section survey of 15,660 British
voters, weighted using the standard BES weight.emphasise that, even if they have the correct beliefs, voters
often have little incentive to act on these beliefs at the
ballot box. This can happen when voters are not willing or
able to use their vote to punish representatives for
wrongdoing, for example if they think the balance of power
in parliament is more important (Rundquist et al., 1977). Of
course, institutional features of a political system also affect
the extent to which voters have to balance different
considerations in determining their vote choice. For
example, electoral systems can inﬂuence the relative
importance of candidate versus party performance in voter
decisions (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Persson and Tabellini,
2000; Persson et al., 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman,
2005; Chang and Golden, 2006).
Testing the separate functioning of the perceptions and
sanctioning steps of electoral accountability for misconduct
is generally difﬁcult, but our empirical strategy with regard
to the UK expenses scandal allows us to overcome many of
these difﬁculties. First, as noted above we can exploit
natural variation in the implication of politicians in the
scandal while holding relatively constant the timing and
nature of the scandal. To our knowledge, this feature of
a scandal is shared only by the US House Banking Scandal
(Dimock and Jacobsen, 1995; Ahuja et al., 1994; Banducci
and Karp, 1994; Clarke et al., 1999).
Second, voter surveys only rarely ask detailed questions
about voter perceptions of wrongdoing. Fortunately, the BES
measured voter beliefs regarding their MP’s expenses
claims shortly after the publication of the ofﬁcial report
investigating the scandal. We supplement these voter-level
survey responses with new measures of the actual public
implication of respondents’ MPs in the expenses scandal.
As a result, we are able to separately and directly test
whether constituent perceptions of MPmisconduct respond
to public information about that MP, and then whether
constituents electorally sanction MPs based on these
perceptions.
Third, cross-sectional surveys measure voter affect
towards the MP and his or her party and voter perceptions
of MP involvement in the scandal at the same point in time.
This makes it difﬁcult to establish to which extent affect
inﬂuences perceptions and vice versa. By using the 2005–
10 BES panel study, we can estimate and control for the
inﬂuence of respondent’s prior affect toward MPs and their
party using measures of these dispositions taken from pre-
scandal waves, which are not affected by respondent
exposure to the scandal. A further advantage of the panel
survey data is that we can use direct measures of vote
choice from post-election waves in 2005 and 2010.
Our key results are as follows. First, in terms of the
perceptions step of electoral accountability, constituent
perceptions of MP expenses-related misconduct were
clearly responsive to publicly available information about
MP behaviour. British voters were substantially more likely
to think that their MP overclaimed on expenses when that
MP was publicly implicated in the expenses scandal. For
example, we estimate a typical voter to be 22 percentage
points more likely to think that their MP overclaimed on
expenses if their MP was, in fact, publicly implicated.
Nevertheless, we also ﬁnd, as expected, that levels of
ignorance (i.e., the numbers of voters who simply “don’t
3 See Besley and Larcinese (2011) for a more detailed discussion of the
different types of expenses allowances available to British MPs.
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considerable and that partisan biases played an important
role in inﬂuencing perceptions. Our ﬁndings are robust to
various alternative speciﬁcations and measures of MP
implication in the expenses scandal. Thus the lack of elec-
toral accountability for expenses-related misconduct in
2010 cannot be attributed solely to a failure in the func-
tioning of the perceptions step of electoral accountability.
Second, we ﬁnd evidence that the sanction step of
electoral accountability functioned only weakly. Regression
analysis of vote choices shows that, controlling for their
political predispositions, constituents were onlymarginally
less likely to vote for their incumbent MP when they
perceived that MP to have overclaimed on expenses. In
terms of predicted probabilities, a typical voter who thinks
that their MP overclaimed on expenses was ﬁve per cent
less likely to vote for him or her than a voter who did not
think their MP overclaimed. While the magnitude of this
effect of perceptions on vote choice is certainly non-
negligible, it is less strong than the effect on perceptions
of public information about MP misconduct. Put simply, if
an MP was publicly implicated in the expenses scandal,
people were reasonably likely to change their perceptions
of the MP’s conduct because of this new information, but
were less likely to change their vote because of their
perceptions.
These ﬁndings imply that voter perceptions of their
representatives’ misconduct are not completely dominated
by ignorance of misbehaviour or by biases based on
partisan or MP-speciﬁc predispositions. They also suggest
that the problem of limited accountability can stem from
sources other than a lack of information: few voters in the
UK chose to punish their MPs for wrongdoing in a situation
where this wrongdoing was highly salient and information
about it was publicly available and clearly inﬂuenced voter
perceptions.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we expand on the two steps necessary for electoral
accountability for misconduct and discuss factors that may
aid or hinder their operation in practice. Then we describe
our new measure of whether or not each MP was publicly
revealed to have made improper expenses claims.
Following this, we empirically examine the inﬂuence of
public information on perceptions of misconduct, before
turning to the consequences of perceptions of misconduct
for electoral choices. We conclude by summarizing our
ﬁndings and considering their implications.
2. Electoral accountability for misconduct:
perceptions and sanction
Before electoral accountability for misconduct can
occur, thewrongdoing by representatives must be exposed.
Often, the media play an important role in investigating,
uncovering and publicizing misbehaviour. In the case of the
expenses scandal, the Telegraph newspaper had exclusive
access to leaked details of MPs’ expenses claims, and
beginning in May 2009, it ran stories on excessive or
questionable claims for several weeks. The scandal quickly
engulfed a large number of MPs and received widespread
media attention (for more details, see Kelso, 2009).In some cases, public information about representatives’
misconduct may stem from an ofﬁcial investigation or
governmental body, not just investigative media reporting.
For example, the 1992 US House Banking Scandal was
triggered when the General Accounting Ofﬁce issued
a report detailing the misbehaviour of members (Dimock
and Jacobsen, 1995). In the case of the expenses scandal,
the House of Commons reacted to relentless media reve-
lations by commissioning Sir Thomas Legg to investigate all
MPs’ claims in detail. Legg’s ﬁnal report, published in
February 2010 (House of Commons Members Estimate
Committee, 2010), focused on overly excessive claims
madewithin the Additional Costs Allowance, a scheme that
allowed MPs to claim money to pay for and maintain
a second home, either in their constituency or in London.3
Nevertheless, it is of course unlikely that many voters
consult the ofﬁcial report into the scandal directly. Rather,
awareness of misconduct exposed by an ofﬁcial investiga-
tion will tend to spread via the national or local media,
campaign groups, local competing candidates and the
politicians themselves (Arnold, 1993).
2.1. Perceptions of misconduct
For accountability to exist, voters need to be aware of
publicly available information about their representatives’
conduct, but the literature suggests two main reasons why
such awareness may be low. First, voters can simply be
ignorant of their representative’s wrongdoing. Gathering
and processing such information is generally costly
(Ferejohn, 1990). Moreover, institutional settings vary in
the extent they provide voters with incentives to become
informed (Stevenson and Vonnahme, 2009; Holmberg,
2009). In Britain, these incentives are low and costs high:
the political system is characterized by strong party
control of representatives in the legislature and low levels
of local campaign spending and local media coverage
(Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Cain et al., 1987; Kam, 2009;
Pattie et al., 1994; Pattie and Johnston, 2004). In addition
to a lack of knowledge, voters may also have biased
perceptions. To reduce the costs associated with
information-gathering, individuals make use of heuristics
when forming an opinion about their representative
(Ferejohn, 1990). A simple decision rule allows voters to
make judgments about their representative even while
remaining relatively ignorant about the representative’s
actual behaviour. Two such rules of thumb may be
particularly inﬂuential in the British context: affect
towards an MP and affect towards the MP’s party. Voters
may be less likely to think that their MP misbehaved if
they are positively predisposed towards him or her. This
positive predisposition may exist because of the MP’s
constituency and parliamentary work (Cain et al., 1987) or
because of their attachment to the MP’s party. Recent
ﬁndings from the UK (e.g. Marsh and Tilley, 2010; Tilley
and Hobolt, 2011) indicate that theories of partisan
perceptual bias (Campbell et al., 1960) travel well.
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Despite the problems of ignorance and bias, some voters
may nevertheless update perceptions of their representa-
tive’s conduct in light of public revelations. But voters also
then have to decide whether this perceived misconduct
should inﬂuence their vote choice. Some voters will believe
that other concerns, such as the balance of power in
parliament, are more important than the misbehaviour of
their representative (Rundquist et al., 1977). Other voters
will decide to punish a representative who they believe has
engaged in wrongdoing. In the latter case, we can speak of
electoral accountability for misconduct: publicly available
information about an MP’s misconduct inﬂuences voter
perceptions, which in turn inﬂuence electoral choices.
The electoral effects of malfeasance have been studied
extensively, though mostly in the US and only to a lesser
extent in other countries. In the US, studies have found that
congressional incumbents chargedwith corruption have lost,
on average, between six and eleven percentage points at the
polls (Peters and Welch, 1980; Welch and Hibbing, 1997).
Furthermore, the impact of the aforementioned US House
Banking Scandal on the vote share of Members of Congress
hasbeen studied extensively (Ahuja et al.,1994; Banducci and
Karp,1994; Clarke et al.,1999). Perhapsmost notably, Dimock
and Jacobsen (1995) found evidence that incumbents were
electorallypunished for theirmisbehaviour.Outsideof theUS,
in a study of Italian legislators across Italian post-war elec-
tions, Chang et al. (2010) show that judicial accusations of
wrongdoing affect re-election rates, but only when there is
sufﬁcient national media attention on such wrongdoing.
In the UK, Farrell et al. (1998) study the relationship
between corruption and vote loss and ﬁnd that candidates
involved in a scandal lose upwards of ﬁve percentage points,
a magnitude similar to that in the US. The speciﬁc electoral
effects of the 2009–10 expenses scandal have been studied
using aggregate constituency-level data (Curtice et al., 2010;
Eggers and Fischer, 2011; Pattie and Johnston, in press) and
survey data with a pre- and post-election panel (Pattie and
Johnston, in press). These studies ﬁnd that involvement in
the scandal had a small negative effect – around 1.5
percentagepoints–on thevote shareof an incumbentMP.We
add to the understanding of the impact of the expenses
scandal by using voter-level panel data to explicitly and
separately test the link between MP involvement and
constituent perceptions on the one hand and that between
constituent perceptions and vote choice on the other.6 We searched The Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph articles
published between 1 January 2009 and 26 March 2010, via NexisUK (an
electronic media search engine). A general article refers to those pieces
wherein the Telegraph listed the claims of ﬁve or more MPs without
speciﬁc details of, for example, the amount an MP claimed per year.
7 Though there were 628 sitting British MPs in the 2005-10 Parliament,
we exclude four groups of MPs when coding our implicated variable: MPs
representing inner-London constituencies, as they were not allowed to
claim expenses under the Additional Costs Allowance and were therefore
never likely to be implicated in the scandal; the three MPs involved in3. MP involvement in the expenses scandal
Our measure of whether a British4 MP who sat in the
2005–10 Parliament was publicly implicated in the
expenses scandal is constructed based on two sources: the
Legg report together with the Daily Telegraph and Sunday
Telegraph.5 We coded anMP as being ‘implicated’ by Legg if4 We exclude the 18 Northern Ireland MPs from our analysis, since the
British Election Study did not survey Northern Ireland residents.
5 We refer to the combined source of the Daily Telegraph and the
Sunday Telegraph as ‘the Telegraph’ throughout the paper.they were formally asked to repay money in his report. We
coded an MP as being ‘implicated’ by the Telegraph if the
speciﬁcs of the MP’s claim were discussed in a Telegraph
article (MPs were not coded as ‘implicated’ by the Tele-
graph if their claims were only mentioned in a general
article on the scandal).6 We focus on the Telegraph as
a media source because it had sole access to the expenses
records and acted as a gatekeeper on public information;
prior to the publication of the Legg report, any MP publicly
implicated was therefore ﬁrst mentioned by the Telegraph.
Our ﬁnal implicated variable equals one if an MP was
coded as being implicated by either the Telegraph or the
Legg report, and zero otherwise. This might be considered
a blunt measure of implication, but we choose this as our
primary measure because it realistically captures whether
or not an MP was publicly exposed as having made
dubious claims. Both the Legg report and the Telegraph
exposed misconduct, but who was implicated in each
source differed. The Legg report did not encompass all
potential types of expenses-related misconduct. For
instance, Geoffrey Clifton Brown, who was the Conserva-
tive Shadow Minister for International Development,
allegedly ‘ﬂipped’ (i.e. changed) his second home desig-
nation from London to his Gloucestershire home and, at
the same time, bought another countryside home for
almost three million pounds. His case garnered tremen-
dous media attention and ridicule, but he was not asked to
repay any money by Legg because his claims were within
the rules. In contrast, Alun Michael’s claims were not
detailed in the Telegraph, but he was ordered in the Legg
report to repay over £19,000 for invalid mortgage claims.
These types of cases illustrate the importance of using
both sources to capture public implication in the scandal.
Though we believe that our combined measure best
captures public implication, we also present robustness
checks using alternative measures.
Overall we have 587 MP-level observations on our
implicated variable.7 Of these, just over two thirds (418) are
coded as implicated and just under a third (169) are not.
This illustrates a useful feature of the expenses scandal for
empirically examining electoral accountability for repre-
sentative misconduct: the fact that a large (though not
overwhelming) proportion of sitting MPs was publicly
exposed for the same types of misconduct in a short time
window.criminal proceedings as a result of their expenses claims, as their mis-
behaviour was qualitatively far different from that of other MPs; the MPs
elected in by-elections between 2005 and 2010, because the survey
respondents did not vote for these MPs in 2005 and because they often
had less chance to be involved in the scandal; and an MP who died in
March 2010, so just before the period the survey was ﬁelded.
Table 1
Voter perceptions of MP behaviour.
MP involvement in expenses scandal Respondent perception of MP overclaiming
Don’t know Did not overclaim Overclaimed Marginal N
Not implicated 46.6% (453) 40.8% (397) 12.6% (123) 973
Implicated 44.2% (993) 25.7% (577) 30.1% (675) 2245
All MPs 44.9% (1446) 30.3% (974) 24.8% (798) 3218
Note: Row percentages shown; data from BES 2005–2010 panel survey and own coding.
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To test the ﬁrst step necessary for electoral account-
ability, we combine our measure of MP involvement in the
expenses scandal with BES panel data. This allows us to
examine whether constituent perceptions of MP conduct
are inﬂuenced by public information concerning this
conduct.4.1. Data
We use survey data from four waves of the BES 2005–10
internet panel study8: the ﬁrst wave, carried out in March
and April 2005, before that year’s general election; the
third wave, from May 2005, after that year’s election; the
ﬁfth wave, from June 2008; and the seventhwave, from late
March/early April 2010, before the 2010 election. Based on
their location, deﬁned in terms of 2005 general election
boundaries, each survey respondent was matched to anMP
from the 2005–10 Parliament and assigned the corre-
sponding implicated score for that MP.9 Our sample consists
of any survey respondent located in one of the 587
constituencies for which there is a non-missing value on
our MP implicated variable. Our resulting data set contains
observations on respondents from 579 of the 587 constit-
uencies for which wemeasure our implicated variable, with
an average of 5 respondents per constituency. Of the 3218
respondents in this data, almost 70 per cent (2245) were
represented in the 2005–10 Parliament by an MP who was
implicated in the scandal by the Telegraph or by Sir Thomas
Legg. The remaining 30 per cent (973) had an MP who was
not implicated in the expenses scandal.
To measure respondent perceptions regarding the
propriety of the expenses claimsmade by theirMP,weutilize
their responses to a question from the seventhwave (March/
April 2010). Respondents were asked whether they had
heard or read about the expenses scandal. Those answering
‘yes’ were then presented with the following question:
Now, thinking about the MP in your local constituency, has
he or she claimed expense money to which they are not
entitled?8 The BES ran parallel internet and face-to-face surveys in 2005, and
detailed inspection has shown that the samples are almost indistin-
guishable (Sanders et al., 2007). Sanders et al. (2011) also report that the
2005–2010 panel continued to be representative of the population in
terms of their reported vote and their vote intention.
9 The BES matches respondents to seats using the postcodes provided
by the participants.The response options were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’.
These responses are our main dependent variable, which
measures whether or not a respondent perceives their MP
to have been guilty of overclaiming on expenses.10 The item
was ﬁelded just before the 2010 election campaign got
underway but after the February 2010 Legg report. As
a result, it measures constituent beliefs about MP’s
expenses claims shortly after the last public revelations
concerning the scandal.
4.2. Descriptive analysis
Table 1 breaks down respondent perceptions of their
MP’s expenses claims according to whether or not the MP
was publicly implicated in the scandal or not.11 The ﬁrst
notable feature of this table is that almost half of the 3218
respondents (44.9 per cent) ‘don’t know’ whether or not
their MP overclaimed. That such a high proportion of
respondents feel unable to form a clear opinion on the
claims of their MP would appear to bear out expectations
that a large proportion of British voters are relatively
uninformed the conduct of their local MP. This of course
places an immediate limit on the operation of the percep-
tions step necessary for accountability for misconduct.
It also appears from Table 1 that voters who do form an
opinion (i.e. do not answer ‘don’t know’) have a tendency to
attribute innocence to their own MP, a ﬁnding that echoes
Fenno’s (1978) well-known paradox that American voters
tend to disapprove of Congress but trust their district’s
representative. The bottom row shows that of the 1772
respondents who state an opinion, over half (55 per cent)
think their MP did not overclaim.
But despite this, there is also clear evidence of an asso-
ciation between public implication of an MP in the scandal
and respondents’ perceptions. Of respondents whose MP
was not implicated, 40.8 per cent think their MP did not
overclaim, compared to 12.6 per cent who think their MP
did overclaim. In contrast, among those respondents whose
MPwas implicated, the corresponding proportions are 25.7
per cent and 30.1 per cent, respectively. This still means that
many people whose MP was implicated still believed he or
she was innocent, but respondents were nevertheless more
likely, by a magnitude of 17.5 percentage points, to think10 We add to the ‘don’t knows’ the very small number of respondentswho
in the previous question indicated they had not heard of the scandal at all.
11 The distribution of responses to this question is very similar in the
BES 2010 cross-sectional pre-campaign internet survey, which has the
advantages of a larger number of respondents. The main difference is that
the number of ‘don’t knows’ increases slightly, probably a consequence of
panel attrition.
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implicated in the scandal.4.3. Regression analysis
Regression analysis can provide ﬁrmer evidence for the
ﬁnding that constituent perceptions of MP conduct differ
depending on whether the MP was publicly implicated in
the scandal. We model our main dependent variable using
multinomial logit since it has three response options
(‘overclaimed’, ‘did not overclaim’ and ‘don’t know’).12
Standard errors are clustered by constituency to account
for the fact that respondents are nested within parlia-
mentary seats.13
Our key explanatory variable is our measure of whether
or not a respondent’s MP was implicated in the expenses
scandal. We also control for a number of other variables that
might plausibly inﬂuence respondent perceptions. The most
important control variables measure partisan and MP-
related voter predispositions. Here, the existence of the
panel survey proves very useful: we can use respondent
answers to items on previous waves to measure important
political attitudes before the scandal broke, so these attitudes
cannot have been inﬂuenced by the expenses scandal itself.
Our ﬁrst control measures a respondent’s previous
electoral support for their 2005–10 incumbent MP. It is
coded as one if (in the 2005 post-election wave of the BES
panel) the respondent reported voting for this MP at the
2005 general election and zero otherwise. This variable acts
as a proxy for the respondent’s prior support towards the
MP’s party as well as towards the MP him- or herself.
Second, as a more direct measure of affect toward an
MP’s party, we control for whether a constituent identiﬁes
with the party of his or her 2005–10 incumbent MP. We
code this binary measure based on a respondent’s answers
to standard party ID items in the 2008 wave of the BES
panel, the last wave before the scandal broke. This variable12 Multinomial logit models assume independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA). But we do not believe the IIA assumption is problematic
here since the three response options are not substantively similar
(Kennedy, 2008). Moreover, IIA is important mainly when we are con-
cerned with the effect of one of the options being added or removed
(Glasgow, 2001). While this can easily occur with parties and candidates,
this is of less relevance in our case. Nevertheless, we ran the Hausman–
McFadden test for each model, and results failed to indicate that the IIA
assumption was a problem.
13 We also tried accounting for the hierarchical nature of our data by
analysing data aggregated to the constituency level (Angrist and Pischke,
2009, p.322) and also by running hierarchical binary logits on pairs of
response options using the original individual-level data. No substan-
tively important differences to the results of the multinomial logit model
were found; see supplemental material for details.
14 We also ran our models using a stricter measure of identiﬁcation with
the MP’s party; respondents were coded as 1 only if they claimed to
identify with the party of their MP in two 2005 waves, the 2006 wave and
the 2008 wave, 0 otherwise (Sanders et al., 2011). (The pre-campaign
2005 wave is excluded from this measure as it did not include the
standard party identiﬁcation question in the whole sample.) We also tried
two further measures that might indicate voter attachment to the MP and
his or her party. We thus substituted party identiﬁcation with party affect
(a 0-10 like-dislike scale) and with an indicator of whether the respon-
dent voted for the MP in question in the 2005 election. The results are
robust to all three modiﬁcations of the measure of voter-MP attachment.equals one if a respondent identiﬁes with the party of their
MP, and zero otherwise.14
Aside from controlling for respondent predispositions
toward their MP, we also control for more general
respondent attributes that may inﬂuence their responses.
We include variables that measure attention paid to politics
and political knowledge, since higher levels of each should
decrease ‘don’t know’ responses. We also include measures
for general trust and political efﬁcacy, since those who do
not trust people in general and feel politically powerless
might be more inclined to think their MP overclaimed.
We include two constituency-level variables. First, in
order to control for the possibility that perceptions differ
for representatives of each party, we control for the party
afﬁliation of a respondent’s MP with three dummy vari-
ables (Conservative, Liberal Democrat and other parties,
respectively, with Labour as the reference category).15 We
also include a control for the notional size of the majority
the winning MP enjoyed in the respondent’s constituency
in 2005 (Norris, 2010).16 The tighter the race in the seat, the
more incentive a constituentmay have to become informed
about the behaviour of their MP, and the more challenger
candidates might try to insinuate wrong-doing on the part
of an incumbent MP.
Finally, we also include a dummy variable that equals one
when a respondent’s 2005 constituency matches his or her
2010 constituency, and zero otherwise.17 The variable
controls for the possibility that the respondent moved
between 2005 and 2010 or that he or shewas assigned a new
incumbent MP due to boundary changes. While our depen-
dent variable is based on a survey questionﬁeldedbefore the
2010 election, and therefore refers to a respondent’s
incumbent under the 2005 electoral boundaries, a respon-
dent whose constituency is due to change under the re-
drawn 2010 boundaries might be less sure of their MP’s
identity and therefore more likely to answer ‘don’t know’.18
Our key results are presented in Table 2. Model 1
includes only our main explanatory variable. Models 2 and
3 then add the series of controls described above, but vary
in the measures of constituent predisposition toward an
MP included: in Model 2, we control for whether the
constituent voted for the MP in the 2005 election, whereas
in Model 3 we also control for identiﬁcation with the party
of the MP.15 Other survey evidence points to the fact that Liberal Democrat MPs
were seen as less implicated by the scandal (YouGov, 2009).
16 We use the notional 2005 majority size based on the 2010 boundaries
since this is more likely to reﬂect the competitiveness of the constituency
in 2010 than the actual 2005 majority size using the old boundaries.
17 This variable (‘seat change’) was created by manually pairing up the
2005 and 2010 constituencies. In cases of boundary changes, 2005
constituencies were matched to successor constituencies. In most cases
a successor constituency was identiﬁed when the incumbent ran again in
a newly-formed constituency that contained part of his or her old
constituency. In the remaining cases, we tried to match 2010 to 2005
constituencies based on the similarity of electorate. The 15 2010-deﬁned
seats that we did not match a 2005 constituency to were either entirely
new seats or correspond to 2005-deﬁned seats where a by-election
occurred between 2005 and 2010.
18 We also ran all models excluding all respondents who are in different
seats in 2005 and 2010. All key ﬁndings are robust to this reduction of the
sample.
Table 2
Predicting voter perceptions of MP behaviour.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
“Did not
overclaim” vs.
“overclaimed”
“Don’t know” vs.
“overclaimed”
“Did not overclaim” vs.
overclaimed”
“Don’t know” vs.
“overclaimed”
“Did not overclaim”
vs. “overclaimed”
"Don’t know"
vs. "overclaimed"
Implicated 1.33*** (0.14) 0.92*** (0.13) 1.41*** (0.16) 1.05*** (0.15) 1.43*** (0.16) 1.12*** (0.15)
Voted for incumbent 0.77*** (0.12) 0.02 (0.12) 0.63*** (0.14) 0.04 (0.14)
Party identiﬁcation 0.29* (0.14) 0.06 (0.14)
General trust 0.09** (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Political efﬁcacy 0.07* (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Attention to politics 0.07* (0.03) 0.28*** (0.03) 0.07* (0.03) 0.28*** (0.03)
Political knowledge 0.09* (0.05) 0.10** (0.04) 0.09 (0.05) 0.11** (0.04)
Seat change 0.03 (0.16) 0.33* (0.14) 0.08 (0.16) 0.30* (0.14)
Majority 2005 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Conservative MP 0.14 (0.15) 0.16 (0.14) 0.19 (0.16) 0.22 (0.14)
Lib Dem MP 0.58* (0.25) 0.11 (0.24) 0.55* (0.26) 0.04 (0.24)
Other MP 0.56 (0.60) 0.69 (0.56) 0.31 (0.63) 0.24 (0.60)
Intercept 1.17*** (0.12) 1.30*** (0.11) 0.36 (0.32) 3.18*** (0.28) 0.38 (0.33) 3.31*** (0.28)
N 3218 2465 2305
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.10 0.10
2 Log Likelihood 3361.716 2379.236 2220.013
AIC 6731.432 4806.472 4492.025
Note: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; data from own coding and BES.
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perceptions regarding the propriety of their MP’s expenses
claims do respond to publicly available information. The
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the implicated
variable across Models 1 to 3 indicate that a constituent
whose MP was publicly implicated in the expenses scandal
is more likely to think that his or her MP overclaimed
(relative to either the ‘did not overclaim’ and to ‘don’t
know’ response options), and that this result is robust to
the inclusion of control variables.
The control variables also largely have the expected
effects. For example, increasing general trust and political
efﬁcacy make a constituent more likely to think that their
MP ‘did not overclaim’ (relative to thinking the MP did
overclaim), while increasing self-reported attention to
politics and political knowledge make a ‘don’t know’
response less likely.19 Interestingly, the coefﬁcients also
indicate that an increase in self-reported political attention
also signiﬁcantly increases a constituent’s probability of
perceiving their MP to have ‘overclaimed’ relative to ‘not19 We also tested whether the effects of MP implication on voter
perceptions were greater among respondents that are more knowl-
edgeable about politics and pay more attention to it. We did so by
including the appropriate interaction term. The results for the political
knowledge–implication interaction offer no evidence that political
knowledge has a statistically signiﬁcant moderating effect on the link
between MP implication and voter perceptions of their MP’s expenses-
related conduct. For the attention–implication interaction, the results
are not straightforward: our ﬁndings indicate a statistically signiﬁcant
interaction, with voters with lower levels of attention slightly more likely
to have a perception that matches the MP’s implication. The explanation
for this counter-intuitive ﬁnding is unclear, but it may be respondents
who are less willing to admit they pay little attention to politics are also
less likely to admit they do not know about their MP’s involvement in the
scandal, and thus more likely to guess whether or not their MP over-
claimed (thus weakening the link between implication and a percep-
tion of over-claiming).overclaimed’. Finally, the coefﬁcients on the MP party
afﬁliation suggest that, all else equal, in 2010 Liberal
Democrats were perceived as more honest with regard to
their expenses claims than other MPs.20
To interpret the magnitude of the effect of MP implica-
tion in the expenses scandal on constituent perceptions, in
Fig. 1 we plot predicted probabilities based on Model 3. We
hold all continuous variables at their mean and categorical
variables at their mode. The top panel presents predicted
probabilities for a constituent who did not vote for their MP
in2005 anddidnot identifywith theMP’s party in2008, and
the bottom panel for a constituent who did both. The effect
of a constituent’s MP being implicated in the scandal is
surprisingly strong. For example, for voters in the top panel
and whose MP is not implicated in the scandal, the proba-
bility of an ‘MP did not overclaim’ perception is around 0.33
and that of an ‘MP did overclaim’ perception is 0.14. In
contrast, for such voters with an MP implicated in the
scandal, the equivalent numbers are 0.20 and 0.35, respec-
tively. This is a clear reversal of relative perceptions among
those with an opinion on their MP’s behaviour. The change
in the predicted probabilities is very similar for voters who
voted for their MP in 2005 and who identiﬁed with their
MP’s party in 2008 (bottom panel). Given the general belief
that voters in Britain know little about their representatives,
the effect of publicly available information is much stronger
than we would have expected.
Yet, it is not the case that constituent perceptions of MP
misconduct are overwhelmingly accurate. First, Table 1
showed that a large proportion of voters simply do not
know whether their MP was involved in the expenses20 We also ran models with appropriate interaction terms to check
whether the effect of wrongdoing on perceptions thereof depended on
the party afﬁliation of the MP or on the marginality of the constituency.
We ﬁnd no evidence for either type of conditionality.
Fig. 1. Voter perceptions of whether MPs claimed excessive expenses. a. Did not vote for MP and does not identify with MP’s party. b. Did vote for MP and does
identify with MP’s party. Note: Based on Model 3, Table 2. Panel (a) holds 2005 vote for MP and party identiﬁcation with MP’s party at ‘no’, panel (b) at ‘yes’. All
other variables held at their means (continuous variables) or modes (indicator variables).
N. Vivyan et al. / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 750–763 757scandal or not, or at the very least do not feel certain in their
beliefs. Second, voter predispositions toward their MP are
also very important in determining voter perceptions of MP
misbehaviour. The estimates forModel 3 (Table 2) show that
having voted for theMP and identifyingwith theMP’s party
increase the probability of thinking that one’s MP did not
overclaim. The two panels of Fig.1 help us to understand the
predicted differences. For example, where an MP is not
implicated in the scandal, a typical constituent who voted
for thatMPand identiﬁeswith theMP’s party is estimated to
think that the MP ‘did not overclaim’ with probability 0.56,
whereas the equivalent estimate is 0.33 for a constituent
who did not vote for the MP and does not identify with the
MP’s party. Similarly, where an MP was implicated in the
scandal, a constituent who voted for the MP and identiﬁes
with theMP’s party is 20 pointsmore likely tomaintain that
their MP did not overclaim than a constituent who neither
voted for the MP nor identiﬁes with the MP’s party. In sum,
voter predispositions toward MPs are as inﬂuential indetermining perceptions of misconduct as whether or not
an MP was publicly implicated in the scandal.
One concern with these results is that they may be an
artefact of the particular way in which we measure public
implication of an MP in the expenses scandal. To show that
this is not the case, in Table 3 we report an extra series of
models of voter perceptions of MP overclaiming that check
the robustness of our ﬁndings to alternative measures of
MP implication. The estimates for Models 4, 5 and 6 show
the regression results for when we break down our impli-
cated measure into its two constituent parts and then
either include these in separate regressions (Models 4 and
5) or together in the same regression (Model 6). The Table
shows that both measures are signiﬁcantly positively
associated with the probability that a voter thinks their MP
overclaimed. In addition, Models 7 and 8 proxy the severity
of an MP’s expense overclaiming by measuring the amount
an MP was asked to repay by Legg (measured continuously
in Model 7 and categorized in Model 8 to allow for
Table 3
Robustness checks for predicting perceptions of MP expenses-related behaviour.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
“Did not
overclaim”/
“overclaimed”
“Don’t know”/
“overclaimed”
“Did not overclaim”/
“overclaimed”
“Don’t know”/
“overclaimed”
“Did not overclaim”/
“overclaimed”
“Don’t know”/
“overclaimed”
“Did not overclaim”/
“overclaimed”
“Don’t know”/
“overclaimed”
“Did not
overclaim”/
“overclaimed”
“Don’t
know”/
“overclaimed”
Alternative measures of MP implication in expenses scandal
Asked to repay any
money by Legg
1.22***
(0.15)
0.77***
(0.14)
0.97*** (0.15) 0.52***
(0.14)
Implicated by Telegraph 1.22*** (0.15) 1.10***
(0.13)
0.98*** (0.15) 0.97***
(0.13)
Raw amount asked to
repay by Legg (£1000s)
0.16***
(0.03)
0.082***
(0.01)
Categorised amount
asked to repay by Legg:
(Reference category: £0)
£1 to £999 0.89*** (0.18) 0.60*** (0.18)
£1000 to £4999 1.35*** (0.19) 0.74*** (0.17)
£5000 or above 2.36*** (0.27) 1.59*** (0.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305
Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11
2 Log Likelihood 2226.583 2215.149 2184.931 2221.489 2192.630
AIC 4505.166 4482.299 4425.861 4494.978 4445.261
Note: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; data from own coding and BES.
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that voters were signiﬁcantly more likely to think their MP
overclaimed the more the MPwas asked to repay. Note that
these models include all of the controls used in Model 3.21
Across all models in Table 3, the coefﬁcient estimates for
these controls are very similar to the corresponding coef-
ﬁcient estimates in Table 2. Further analyses (included in
the Supplemental materials) also show that voter percep-
tions of how much MPs overclaimed are related to the
actual amount they were ordered to repay in the Legg
report. Thus, our central ﬁnding, that public information
about an MP’s expenses claims has a substantive inﬂuence
on constituent perceptions of those claims, is robust to
alternative measures of public implication.5. Perceptions of misconduct and constituent vote
choice
Do constituents then sanctionMPs they perceive to have
overclaimed? To answer this question, we test whether
a constituent is less likely to vote for an incumbent MP at
the 2010 general election if they believe that he or she
overclaimed in the expenses scandal.22 Of course, not all
2005–10 incumbent MPs stood for re-election in 2010, and
boundary changes introduced at the 2010 election further
complicate the picture. Because we are interested in
whether constituents use their votes to hold their incum-
bent representatives electorally accountable for perceived
misconduct, for this part of the analysis we restrict our
sample to those respondents who were located in a 2010-
deﬁned constituency where a sitting MP ran for re-election
in 2010, and who had been represented by that MP
between 2005–10.23
Are voters who think their MP overclaimed more
likely to vote for an opposing candidate?24 Our21 A further concern is that panel attrition and/or the initial make-up of
the internet panel may have led to an over-representation of well-
informed and politically involved respondents, which might in turn
lead us to over-estimate the responsiveness of constituent perceptions to
local MP implication. While we cannot completely allay this concern with
the available data, we do control for respondents’ political knowledge and
self-reported political attention in our models. Furthermore, inspection of
the distribution of these variables in our data indicates that there is at
least a sizeable number of respondents with low scores on these two
variables (for example, there are 79 respondents with the lowest possible
score on the attention measure).
22 Our focus is on incumbent MPs as we are interested in accountability
for misbehaviour. However, even new replacement candidates could face
negative electoral consequences if voters decide to sanction them for
their predecessor’s wrongdoing or if their predecessor’s behaviour also
shapes perceptions of his or her replacement.
23 We would be underestimating voter sanctioning of misconduct if the
worst offenders had resigned before the election. However, as noted
above even among the most consistently implicated MPs, more than half
chose to run again (Pattie and Johnston, in press), so focusing on re-
standing MPs should not make our estimates severely unrepresentative.
24 It may also be that voters who think their MP overclaimed would be
more likely to abstain, especially if they would prefer to support the party
of that MP. However, we cannot carry out useful analyses of turnout
decisions with our data because self-reported turnout is very high, partly
a consequence of our focus on panel data. Unfortunately, validated vote
data is only available for the BES pre-/post-election face-to-face survey
data.dependent variable here is a binary measure that equals
one if the respondent voted for the incumbent MP at the
2010 general election, and zero if he or she voted for
another candidate. This variable is coded based on
a respondent’s self-reported vote choice in the 2010
post-election wave of the BES panel. Since our depen-
dent variable is dichotomous, we use binary logistic
regression, again clustering standard errors by constit-
uency. Because of the attrition that arises due to the use
of an extra panel wave, and the restriction of the sample
to respondents with an incumbent MP re-running in
2010 who also voted in the election, our overall sample
size is here reduced to 1134.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the cate-
gorical measure of whether or not a respondent believed
that their incumbent MP was guilty of overclaiming on
expenses, or whether they did not know; we use the ‘did
not overclaim’ perception as the baseline.25 A potential
complication here is that, as we have already shown,
respondents who are predisposed toward their incumbent
MP (either for MP-speciﬁc or partisan reasons) are less
likely to perceive that MP to have overclaimed on expenses,
but these predispositions are also likely to inﬂuence vote
choice. To deal with this, we again take advantage of the
panel nature of our data and control for a respondent’s
predisposition toward their MP as measured prior to our
expenses perceptions variable. Thus, in Model 9 we control
for whether, at the 2005 election, a respondent voted for
their 2005–10 incumbent MP. This captures the prior
electoral behaviour of the voter. Furthermore, in Model 10
we include a further control for whether the respondent
identiﬁed with the party of their incumbent MP when
surveyed in 2008. In both models we also account for
differential partisan swings at the 2010 election by
including dummies indicating the party afﬁliation of
a respondent’s MP.26
As the estimates for Models 9 and 10 show (Table 4),
both of our measures of respondent predisposition toward
an MP are strongly positively associated with voting for an
incumbent MP.27 Nevertheless, while the coefﬁcient on the
‘don’t know’ dummy variable is not signiﬁcant, the coefﬁ-
cient on the ‘overclaimed’ dummy variable is both signiﬁ-
cant and negative. This provides strong evidence that when
a constituent perceived their MP to have made improper
expenses claims, they were less likely to support that MP at
election time.25 There may also be an effect of MP wrongdoing on voting behaviour
that does not operate via constituent perceptions, for example if the MP’s
misbehaviour led to increased campaign effort among opponents and
decreased effort by the MP. We tested this by using misbehaviour itself as
a predictor variable instead of perceptions, and actual misbehaviour has
no effect on vote choice.
26 We also tried including three constituency-level variables: the length
of time the MP has been in parliament; whether the MP sat on the
government or opposition front bench; and the (notional) majority won
by the MP in 2005. Since none of these variables proved to be signiﬁcant
predictors, we leave them out of the models we present.
27 Our sample size changes between Models 9 and 10 because we
include different predictors in each model and these predictors have
different numbers of missing observations.
Fig. 2. Perceptions of misconduct and vote choice. Note: Based on Model 10, Table 4. Panel (a) holds 2005 vote for MP and party identiﬁcation with MP’s party at
‘no’, panel (b) at ‘yes’. All other variables held at their means (continuous variables) or modes (indicator variables).
Table 4
Constituent perceptions and vote choice.
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Perception of MP overclaiming
(Reference: Did not overclaim)
Don’t know 0.19 (0.18) 0.20 (0.19)
Overclaimed 0.50* (0.21) 0.47* (0.24)
Amount overclaimed (Not guilty as missing) 0.11þ (0.06)
Amount overclaimed (Not guilty as 1) 0.11** (0.04)
Voted for incumbent in 2005 2.65*** (0.16) 1.92*** (0.19) 1.91*** (0.39) 1.97*** (0.25)
Party identiﬁcation 1.62*** (0.20) 1.69*** (0.42) 1.30*** (0.27)
Conservative MP 0.33* (0.16) 0.48** (0.18) 0.83* (0.38) 0.69** (0.22)
Liberal Democrat MP 0.27 (0.25) 0.65* (0.26) 0.77 (0.72) 0.41 (0.31)
Other MP 0.15 (0.76) 0.21 (0.88) 0.87** (0.33) 0.53 (1.17)
Intercept 1.46*** (0.19) 1.86*** (0.20) 2.08***(0.41) 1.87*** (0.20)
N 1134 1076 268 615
Pseudo-R2 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.48
2 Log likelihood 1122.159 987.948 215.280 572.308
AIC 1136.159 1003.948 229.2797 586.308
Note: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, þ: p < 0.1; cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; data from own coding and BES.
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dicted probabilities based on Model 10 for two types of
respondents in Fig. 2. The left panel shows the probability
of voting for the incumbent MP for a respondent who did
not vote for that MP in 2005 and who does not identify
with the MP’s party. For such voters, a perception of guilt28 We also checked whether the link between perceptions and vote
choice depends on party identiﬁcation or MP affect. To do so, we ran
models with an interaction between respondent perceptions of miscon-
duct, identiﬁcation with MP’s party in 2005, and respondent vote in 2005.
None of the interaction term coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant. However, the
direction of the moderating effect indicates that perceptions of wrong-
doing may inﬂuence vote choice only among voters those who did not
identify with their MP’s party, which would mean that party identiﬁers
are more resistant to changing their vote choice as a result of their beliefs
regarding their MP’s behaviour.reduces the probability of voting for the incumbent by ﬁve
points, from 0.14 to 0.09. The right panel shows the same
probabilities for voters who identify with the MP’s party
and voted for him or her in 2005. The overall predicted
probabilities are much higher, but the decline due to
a perception of MP overclaiming is a similar 7 points (from
0.84 to 0.77). Furthermore, ninety-ﬁve per cent conﬁdence
intervals (not graphed here) indicate that the marginal
effects on vote choice of moving from a ‘did not overclaim’
to an ‘overclaimed’ perception are signiﬁcant for both types
of voters.28
As a further check on our results, we also estimate the
association between the amount of money a respondent
believed their MP had overclaimed and the probability of
voting for the MP. To measure perceptions of the severity of
an MP’s overclaiming, we use answers to a BES item that
asked respondents to state howmuch expense money they
N. Vivyan et al. / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 750–763 761thought their MP had overclaimed, on a scale of 0–10 (with
higher scores corresponding to greater amounts). This item
was asked as a follow-up question only to those respon-
dents who believed their MP had overclaimed. We deal
with this by coding the variable in two ways: in Model 11,
we use the raw scores, treating as missing those respon-
dents who did not think their MP overclaimed; inModel 12,
we include all respondents who thought their MP either
did or did not overclaim by coding the latter respondents
as 1. The coefﬁcient sizes for the perceived extent of
overclaiming are similar in both Models. In terms of
marginal effects, in Model 12 a one standard-deviation
change in the perceived severity of overclaiming is pre-
dicted to lead to about a 6 per cent reduction in the prob-
ability of voting for the incumbent. This effect is similar in
magnitude to the impact of thinking an MP had over-
claimed at all in the Model 10.29 This suggests that our
estimate of the magnitude of the effect of perceptions of
misconduct on vote choice is not an artefact of the way we
code perceptions.
In sum, there is evidence that at the 2010 general elec-
tion British voters to some extent acted to sanction MPs
electorally for perceived overclaiming on expenses by
voting for an opponent.30 Considering that perceived MP
implication in the scandal is just one of many possible
considerations at a general election, a ﬁve per cent reduc-
tion in the probability of voting for a candidate due to
perceived wrongdoing is not trivial. Nevertheless, effects of
this size do not suggest that perceptions of MP misconduct
were strong determinants of voting behaviour.
The predicted inﬂuence of perceptions on vote choice
can be combined with the predicted inﬂuence of implica-
tion on perceptions in order to gauge how implication
indirectly affects vote choice via perceptions. To do this, we
consider an average voter with all controls held at their
mean value in the data. First, we calculated the predicted
probability for average voters of thinking their MP was
implicated, depending on whether or not the MP was in
fact implicated. Then, we calculated the predicted proba-
bility for that average respondent of voting for the incum-
bent based on these perceptions, again separately for
implicated and non-implicated MPs. For non-implicated
MPs, the predicted probability that an average voter will
vote for them is 38.7 per cent. This drops to 36.8 per cent
for implicatedMPs. This indicative calculation suggests that
implication in the scandal reduced the predicted proba-
bility of voting for the incumbent by 1.9 per cent. This
overall effect of MP implication on the vote choice of an
average voter implies an aggregate effect of MP implication
on MP vote share that is similar in magnitude to that ob-
tained in existing aggregate-level analyses of the expenses
scandal (Curtice et al., 2010; Eggers and Fischer, 2011;
Pattie and Johnston, in press).29 The marginal effect is calculated for a case where the respondent has
a Labour MP, voted for his or her incumbent and identiﬁes with the MP’s
party.
30 As Curtice et al. (2010) show, there is evidence of this at the aggregate
level as well.6. Conclusion
Using the uniquely advantageous case of the UK
expenses scandal, we have provided new evidence as to
why electoral accountability for representative misconduct
may function imperfectly. With regard to voter perceptions
of their MP’s conduct, whilst almost half of voters do not
know whether their MP was involved in the scandal and
whilst perceptions are biased by political predispositions,
our ﬁndings nevertheless demonstrate that voter beliefs
about the expenses-related conduct of their MP are clearly
and strongly inﬂuenced by public revelations concerning
that conduct. Given past research and the institutional
setting of the UK, we are surprised that the responsiveness
of perceptions to publicly available information is as high as
it is.
Turning to sanctions, we ﬁnd that constituent percep-
tions do not translate strongly into electoral punishment:
few voters punish their MP for perceived misbehaviour. A
perception that an incumbent MP had overclaimed on
expenses was associatedwith a predicted decline of around
5 per cent in the probability of voting for him or her. Thus,
constituents to some extent hold their MPs accountable for
perceived misconduct, but the link between perceptions
and vote choice is weak compared to that between publicly
available information and perceptions.
When the two steps are considered jointly, we would
predict an average voter to be 1.9 percentage points less
likely to vote for an implicated incumbent MP than for
a non-implicated MP. This small effect is consistent with
previous studies of the scandal (Curtice et al., 2010; Eggers
and Fischer, 2011; Pattie and Johnston, in press).
Apart from the availability of panel survey data and
good measures of voter perceptions of misconduct, a key
advantage of our research designwas the fact that we could
hold the nature and timing of the scandal constant while
exploiting natural variation in whether a survey respon-
dent’s MP was implicated in the scandal. Of course, this
means that we could only examine one type of scandal, the
misuse of parliamentary expenses. We do not claim that
the pattern we ﬁnd need apply to all cases of scandal. For
example, in situations where the wrongdoing was more
severely unethical or more clearly isolated in media
reporting, even voters in the UK may be likely to over-
whelmingly punish their representative. One example is
the case of Neil Hamilton, a Conservative MP who lost his
seat as a direct result of his involvement in the so-called
cash-for-questions affair in 1997.
Notwithstanding this qualiﬁcation, our ﬁndings have
three important implications. First, while ignorance and
bias about representative misconduct exist, these do not
dominate voter perceptions, and information about repre-
sentatives clearly inﬂuences constituent perceptions. This
is the case even in a system as dominated by party – rather
than candidate – competition such as the UK, where the
institutional setting works against voters learning about
the conduct of their speciﬁc MP (Cain et al., 1987; Carey and
Shugart, 1995; Pattie and Johnston, 2004; Kam, 2009).
Second, in contrast to other studies which emphasise the
critical role of publicly available information about the
misconduct of representatives in assuring electoral
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2010), our ﬁndings point to the fact that electoral
accountability can fail even in situations where a lack of
information is not the main problem. Third, if electoral
accountability for misconduct is our goal, it is important to
ensure that voters can use the information they have to
sanction their representatives. The British-style party-
centric political system works against voters conditioning
their vote choice on MP behaviour and may explain why
even voters who think their representative engaged in
wrongdoing decide to cast their vote based on other
considerations. These incentives are likely to be signiﬁ-
cantly different under other institutional arrangements,
such as open lists or primaries, which allow voters to
separate their vote for their MP from their vote for a party.
So, while it is absolutely necessary that voters are provided
with information about misconduct and that they update
beliefs based on this information, we also need to choose
institutional frameworks that allow voters to use that
information to guide their vote choice.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can
be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.electstud.2012.06.010.
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